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Private Tragedies?  Family Law
as Social Insurance
Anne L. Alstott*
Family law is full of private tragedy.  Case after case pits one family
member against another in a zero-sum struggle for resources.  Spouses battle
over limited assets; parents clash over child support; and children fight each
other for resources when parental income is stretched across multiple fami-
lies.  Bad choices and bad luck, it seems, precipitate calamity; and there is
little that the law can do when families self-destruct amidst unemployment,
poverty, mental illness, disability, substance abuse, domestic violence, child
neglect, and other problems.1
By legal tradition, family law is private law: it governs relationships
between individuals, rather than between individuals and the state.2  On this
view, family law, like other forms of private law, exists primarily to foster
private order.  On this view, family law should implement individuals’ inten-
tions—and should not redistribute risk and resources according to some pub-
lic ideal.  As private law, then, family law’s core mission is to resolve
disputes among family members when private order breaks down.  Accord-
ingly, functional families should have little to do with the law; they manage
their own affairs without legal supervision.  Dysfunctional families, by con-
trast, involve the law in inevitable tragedy.  Once affective bonds have
frayed and private order has failed, the courts must resolve disputes as best
they can, and all too often any decision will harm one party or the other.
This Essay argues that this view of family law rests on an exaggerated
distinction between private and public.  Family law is more than a mecha-
nism for implementing private preferences and resolving disputes when pri-
vate order breaks down.  Instead, family law forms part of a larger system of
public law—a social insurance system that allocates the risk of life events
like disability, family breakup, mental illness, substance abuse, and parental
poverty.  Family law does not simply pick up the pieces when individuals
make bad choices or suffer bad luck.  Instead, the law creates distributive
rules that help determine which choices are bad ones and whose bad luck
* Manley O. Hudson Professor, Harvard Law School.  I thank Janet Halley for helpful
comments.  The Harvard Law School and the Harvard Law School Fund for Tax and Fiscal
Policy Research provided research support.
1 For numerous examples of these problems in case law, see, for example, JUDITH AREEN
& MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW (5th ed. 2006).
2 See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1 (1995) (describing pri-
vate law as “connect[ing] two particular parties through the phenomenon of liability”).  Not
all elements of law taught in a typical family law course are “private law” in this sense: the
constitutional law of reproductive rights, for instance, is public law.  But divorce, alimony,
property settlement, and child support—core topics taught in a standard introductory course on
family law—are typically thought to be private law, because they settle the legal rights of
spouses against each other.
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carries ruinous consequences.  Taking this view, it is not just the dysfunc-
tional who live in law’s domain: successful families flourish amidst legal
rules that protect some from life’s risks while leaving others vulnerable.
Put another way, family law rules that establish financial relationships
and liability between individuals constitute a form of social insurance: the
rules of family law supplement those of familiar public programs, like Social
Security and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), that address
life risks including poverty, unemployment, and disability.  For instance,
family law confers a legal right to care and to financial support based on
formalized marriage, biological and adoptive parenthood, and certain kinds
of recognized and rewarded behavior during marriage.  Social insurance in
the United States also adopts categorical protections; and while these vary
across programs, distinctions may reflect formal marital status, paid-employ-
ment history, and income level.  The categories and their consequences may
differ in the two regimes, but both systems of law adopt normative classifi-
cations that recognize some relationships (and not others) and protect against
some risks (and not others).  Further, both systems of law can be understood
as distributing risks ex ante, rather than simply addressing failure ex post.
One apparent difference between the obviously public realm of social
insurance and the purportedly private sphere of family law lies in the redis-
tributive power of the two types of law.  Family law typically limits support
obligations to a small class of related people: it imposes alimony obligations
on spouses and support duties on parents or children.  And family law does
not have access to the state’s taxing power, no matter how great a spouse’s or
child’s need.  By contrast, social insurance deliberately uses the power of the
state to effect broad redistribution—taxing workers, income earners, and
consumers for the legal benefit of third parties.
But this difference too is often overstated.  Some family law rules use
state power to impose lasting obligations on people who are affective or
literal strangers, who believe themselves to have contracted around responsi-
bility, or who are actively hostile to one another.  Think about the child
support obligations of an estranged parent or a divorced stepparent, filial
responsibility laws that tax children with the support of their aged parents, or
alimony imposed on long-divorced spouses.  One scholar has proposed a
child support assurance plan that would blend the two regimes, expanding
family law’s mandate to include a claim on public funds if needed.3  At the
same time, some social insurance programs do not redistribute among indi-
viduals.  They may simply extract a fee for services or regulate the purchase
of certain goods, or they may create an intrapersonal obligation of an indi-
vidual to her (older) self or to her own family.  Think about private accounts
proposed to replace Social Security or mandated benefits like family leave
that may reduce workers’ own wages.
3 See IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT 45–50 (1994); discussion infra notes
54–58 and accompanying text.
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In this Essay, I begin to integrate family law and social insurance, with
the goal of gaining a better understanding of both regimes and their relation-
ship to each other.  To make the discussion concrete, I consider two cases—
one involving spousal support and disability and the other involving child
support for multiple families—and I demonstrate that they illustrate two
points of overlap in family law and social insurance.  First, both cases illus-
trate the interdependence of financial entitlements in family law and in so-
cial welfare.  Both legal regimes make assumptions about the other and
about the existence of family financial support and care.  And the two re-
gimes operate together to determine who suffers financial disaster when
families break up and when disability and poverty strike.
Second, both cases demonstrate that a range of changes in family law,
social welfare law, or other elements of law could alter the distribution of
life’s risks—and thus the likelihood and consequences of apparently private
tragedies.  For example, scholars have debated whether child support should
be imposed on parents alone or shared by the state.4  A social insurance
analysis challenges the binary distinction (parent/state) and opens up new
possibilities ranging from small income taxes on extended family members
to taxation of the child’s own (adult) earnings.
To be sure, present family law and social insurance address different, if
sometimes co-occurring, life risks.  Family law governs disruptions in what I
term “affective life”—the realm of life including formalized family bonds
of marriage and parenthood, as well as less formal but still important emo-
tional relationships including cohabitation and potentially even friendship.5
By contrast, social insurance addresses disruptions in working life—disabil-
ity, unemployment, retirement, and low wages.  It might seem, then, that the
two bodies of law are distinct enough to occupy separate analytic categories.
But one agenda of this Essay is to challenge the split embodied in cur-
rent law between large scale, ex ante, public protections for working life and
smaller scale, ex post, purportedly private protections for affective life.  Put
another way, I want to frame as problematic the fact that conventional social
insurance takes work disruption—and only work disruption—as its subject.
The risks of working life are, indeed, major risks in a capitalist society.  But
an engagement with family law helps remind us that a wider range of risks
can threaten adults’ well-being and children’s development.  Disruptions in
affective life can also threaten economic security and individual develop-
ment: divorce, parental exit, and parental dysfunction, for instance, can lead
to calamity just as surely as unemployment and disability.
4 This is an old and still debated question.  For a discussion of the debate and a contribu-
tion, see ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT (2004).
5 For other scholarship recommending attention to what I term “affective life,” see, for
example, Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2008) (recommending
a deeper integration of psychoanalytic models of emotional development into family law in
order to recognize the importance of emotional relationships outside formal legal boundaries);
Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007) (suggesting that
family law should recognize relationships of care beyond those in marriage and marriage-like
relationships).
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My point, then, is that once we understand social insurance as the use
of law to address, in a deliberate way, the major risks of life, then the focus
of present programs on the risks of paid employment begins to seem oddly
narrow.  A first step, which I take here, is to show how family law oper-
ates—despite its traditional private-law label—as social insurance for affec-
tive life.  A second step, which I defer to a larger project, is to ask whether
public programs ought to address, more explicitly, the consequences of risks
traditionally covered by family law—risks of divorce, nonmarriage,
parenthood, and childhood.
Would it be sensible, feasible, or desirable for the conventional social
insurance system to expand its mission to respond to disruptions in affective
life as well as to disruptions in working life?  A larger project will delineate
in more detail the elements of present law that insure affective life.  The
Conclusion describes the scope of the project in more detail and acknowl-
edges the hard normative and empirical questions it raises.
This Essay, and the larger project of which it is part, owes much to
feminist scholarship connecting social welfare and family law and challeng-
ing distinctions between public and private and between work and care.6  For
instance, many scholars (and I am one) have recommended reforming social
welfare and social insurance programs with the aim of improving the finan-
cial security of children and their caregivers.7  This Essay aims to add to
existing work on social welfare, families, and gender by suggesting how to
map more fully the legal structures that allocate a wider range of life risks,
including not only care work but disability, unemployment, domestic vio-
lence, substance abuse, and poverty.
In a larger sense, this Essay also builds on family law scholarship chal-
lenging the private/public distinction and situating the family in its full legal
context.  Thanks to the efforts of many scholars, family law today encom-
passes the study of gender, domestic violence, reproductive rights, and the
regulation of sexuality—issues that span legal fields from constitutional law
to torts to criminal law and beyond.8  Like these scholars, I aim to situate the
seemingly private tragedies of family life in a larger legal context.
6 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
(1995) (arguing that the state and the family support inevitable dependency); LINDA C. MC-
CLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES (2006) (considering how the state should support family life);
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989) (arguing that justice requires
public attention to, and reform in, the purportedly private realm of family life); Gillian Lester,
A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2005) (addressing proposals for
labor regulations to improve working conditions for parents).
7 See ALSTOTT, supra note 4, at 171–204 (recommending new public programs to address
the economic vulnerability of parents); FINEMAN, supra note 6, at 230–33 (recommending state
support for mothers).
8 See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 1999), at 136–80 (gender roles),
291–325, 1334–43 (domestic violence), 1029–56 (reproductive rights), 25–45 (sexual
identity).
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I. IN RE MARRIAGE OF WILSON: SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND DISABILITY
Spousal support (alimony) offers one divorced spouse a legal claim for
continued financial support from the other.  A California case, In Re Mar-
riage of Wilson,9 illustrates the interplay of spousal support with Social Se-
curity disability and shows how changing family law rules, social insurance
entitlements, or other legal regimes might alter the seemingly zero-sum, pri-
vate tragedy of the Wilson marriage.
A. The Tragedy: Divorce and Disability
Tom and Elma Wilson married in 1976, when he was thirty-six and she
was thirty-eight.10  Their marriage lasted a little less than six years.  Four
years into the marriage, in 1980, Elma fell and suffered severe brain damage
and deficits in social judgment, common sense, and social intelligence.  She
could no longer work, and doctors predicted that the damage would be per-
manent.  They divorced in 1982, and Tom paid Elma alimony of $500 per
month.  Together with $436 per month in Social Security disability benefits,
Elma could just make ends meet.
But after paying spousal support for more than four years, Tom had had
enough.  He sued to stop paying alimony, and Elma contested.  Their dis-
pute, Wilson v. Wilson, exemplifies the kind of private tragedy family law
routinely encounters.  The trial court, and then the appellate court, faced a
zero-sum game.  Relieving Tom of his support obligation would leave the
disabled Elma in need and with no capacity to support herself.  But continu-
ing Tom’s support obligation would limit his capacity to make a fresh start in
life.  (Note that in Wilson and in this Essay, the technical term “spousal
support” means legally mandated, post-separation or post-divorce payments;
the term does not refer to the financial support offered to a spouse in an
intact marriage.)
According to the trial court, Wilson posed a conflict between two lines
of family law doctrine.  On the one hand, the law treats marriage as a serious
obligation with lasting consequences.  Spouses are understood to be part of
an economic community, so that a needy (former) spouse has a legitimate
claim on a prosperous one, even after divorce.  Of the eight factors to be
weighed in spousal support cases under California law at the time, six of
them implemented this principle of need: the factors gave weight to Elma’s
disability, her age, her employment prospects; and to Tom’s greater earnings
and assets, and his higher living standard.11  On the other hand, the court
9 In re Marriage of Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
10 See id. at 524 (noting that in 1986, at the time of the support hearing, Tom was forty-six,
and Elma was forty-eight).
11 For a list of factors, see id.
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noted, the law does permit marital dissolution,12 and implicit in that decision
must be a principle that at some point marital obligations cease so that each
spouse may get on with his or her life.
The trial court asked, “[A]t what point in time does the obligation to
assist Mrs. Wilson become one of society’s as distinguished from an obliga-
tion that is Mr. Wilson’s?” and found “that it is society’s at this point in
time.”13  The appellate court found that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in balancing the equities and finding “under these circumstances
the obligation to assist Elma should shift from Tom to society.”14
The appellate court mentioned, in passing, that Elma received $436 per
month in “Social Security” benefits.  The reference, presumably, is to Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which is payable to workers with a
substantial work history.  In 1986, when Wilson terminated Tom’s support
obligation, the federal poverty threshold for one person was $5,360.15  With
Tom’s support, Elma lived modestly but sustainably at about 200% of the
official poverty line.  Without Tom’s support, Elma’s $436 per month
($5,232 per year) would leave her below the official poverty line, a living
standard that represents dire economic distress.16
Wilson remains good law, although its application to particular cases is
uncertain given the multi-factor determinations necessary. A subsequent
California case declined to read Wilson as establishing a broad public policy
against long-term spousal support.17  In that case, the appellate court re-
versed a trial court order terminating spousal support for a functionally dis-
abled, fifty-nine-year-old woman after a marriage of nine years.  The court
cautioned that the Wilson holding should be considered in the specific con-
text of the marriage at issue and called for a careful weighing of all the
factors in each case.
Wilson takes place against the backdrop of legal reforms intended to
protect displaced homemakers.  These spouses, typically wives, spent years
rearing children and subordinating their careers (if any) to ensure that their
12 Id.  For another case involving spousal support and disability, see In re Marriage of
Biderman, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding trial court’s termination of
spousal support for clinically depressed and unemployed ex-husband).
13 Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (quoting trial court).
14 Id. at 525–27.
15 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRIOR HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES AND
FEDERAL REGISTER REFERENCES (1986) (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 5105 (Feb. 11, 1986)), available
at http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/figures-fed-reg.shtml.
16 The official poverty measure is well-known to reflect a cumulation of analytic errors
and questionable normative judgments.  Constructed in the early 1960s with limited data, the
poverty line has been updated only for inflation (and not for growth in national income and
living standards) since then, with the result that the poverty line today represents extremely
severe economic distress.  Many social scientists (though not all) believe that the official pov-
erty line is too low; they adopt instead a measure in the range of 200% of poverty in order
better to approximate economic deprivation relative to the living standard in the modern
United States. See Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 43 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6–8, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
17 In re Marriage of Heistermann, 286 Cal. Rptr. 127, 130, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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husbands could work full-time and develop their own careers.  Upon di-
vorce, these often middle-aged women found themselves at a disadvantage
in the labor market, and yet, at one point, the doctrine of spousal support
called for them to become self-supporting on the theory that the dissolution
of a marriage properly leaves each party to subsist solely on his or her own
earning power.  In effect, the limitation of spousal support permitted the hus-
bands to retain most of the value of their own earnings while consigning the
wives to live on their own wages—typically at a far lower standard of living
than they had while married.18
In response to criticism by scholars, lawmakers, and others, the law of
spousal support developed, albeit unevenly, to incorporate protections for
the displaced homemaker.  We can see these protections in Wilson, where
the court acknowledged the protections accorded to longer marriages, those
with children, and those in which one spouse sacrificed for the other.
The irony, of course, is that the court in Wilson not only found these
protections inapplicable to Elma but also made use of them to terminate her
spousal support.  Drawing a contrast to the long-married, self-sacrificing,
good mother protected by the law, the appellate court described the Wilson
partnership as “a childless marriage of short duration”19 and referred to
Elma as “a middle aged bartender with adult children.”20  In the next sen-
tence, the court implied that Elma did little to accommodate Tom, again
drawing an implicit contrast with the family-centered homemaker who
leaves her job: “[Elma’s] lifestyle was established [at the time of the mar-
riage and did not change thereafter].”21
Wilson thus poses hard questions about the nature of marriage: Should
the law presume that all marriages create solemn, life-long obligations?  Or
should the law, in effect, recognize a lesser category of companionate mar-
riage, signaled by middle-aged entry and childlessness, and accommodated
by the law with an easier-come, easier-go set of obligations?
At first glance, Wilson represents a classic private tragedy.  The law of
spousal support presents the courts with a zero-sum game: they can protect
the needy Elma, but only by yoking Tom to a long-term financial burden that
would limit his life options and deny him, perhaps, the ability to marry
again.
The courts, then, must harm one party or the other, and perhaps for that
reason, both the trial and appellate opinions adopt language that emphasizes
Elma’s (risky) choices and bad luck: she is a “middle-aged bartender” with
adult children whose father is no longer in the picture.  Her bad luck—or
perhaps her “drunken stupor”—left her with brain damage.  At the same
18 See HARRY D. KRAUSE & DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 297–98 (5th
ed. 2007).
19 Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
20 Id. at 526.
21 Id.  The court also repeats, in a footnote, Tom’s charge that Elma fell while in a
“drunken stupor” and Elma’s rather incoherent response to the effect that she had a hunch, but
no distinct memory, that Tom had been involved in her fall. Id. at 523 n.1.
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time, the courts implicitly treat Tom’s (better) choices and luck as equally
private and personally owned.  Elma did not, says the court, make sacrifices
to further Tom’s career; nor did they have children together.  In the end, the
courts resolve the private tragedy by appealing to public law.  Tom’s private
obligation to Elma, the courts find, has come to an end, and so Elma must
become a state responsibility, a public charge.
But a closer look at the legal context of Wilson reveals how Tom’s and
Elma’s choices and luck occurred amidst two social insurance systems—the
law of marriage and the Social Security program.  We do not always think of
legal marriage as a form of social insurance, and of course marriage repre-
sents more than that.  Still, the financial support and in-kind care obligations
that attend marriage (as well as those that persist following divorce) re-
present a significant potential resource for people with disabilities.  The
scope of marital obligation is clearly the issue presented in Wilson, and the
trial court addressed it head-on: in the court’s view, Elma had exhausted the
social insurance entitlement accruing to her particular marriage and would
now become the state’s responsibility.
But the decision in Wilson likely did not qualify Elma for any addi-
tional state support—despite her dire situation.  Social Security disability
insurance is categorical, meaning that only those suffering severe work disa-
bility can qualify, and those who return to employment can no longer claim
benefits.  But the program is not income-tested, meaning that benefits do not
rise if the beneficiary’s income drops.  Thus, Elma’s monthly cash benefit
was determined by her own earnings and work history, and it would not
increase if her other sources of income disappeared.22
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a means-tested program that can
supplement Social Security disability benefits, but it assists only those in
extreme poverty.  While SSDI provides a benefit based solely on past earn-
ings (and thus is paid without regard to current income), SSI is means-tested
and paid only to those in the direst financial circumstances.  In 1982, Elma
would most likely have been ineligible for SSI, which, during this period,
provided maximum benefits for a single person amounting to less than sev-
enty-five percent of the individual poverty line.23
Strikingly, then, and despite the court’s rhetoric, the denial of spousal
support in Elma’s situation did not impose any additional responsibility on
the state.  Instead, the decision left Elma to live in dire poverty, subsisting on
22 At age sixty-two, Elma’s situation might improve—or it might not.  She could not qual-
ify for higher benefits based on Tom’s earnings record since they were married less than ten
years.  If she had been married before (a matter not clear from the opinion), and if her first
marriage had lasted ten years or more, she might at age sixty-two qualify for a higher retire-
ment benefit if her former husband’s earnings were high enough.  Her intervening marriage to
Tom would not affect eligibility since the marriage ended in divorce.
23 See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 110TH CONG., 2008 GREEN
BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS § 3-17 tbl.3-3 (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://ways
andmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/ssi.pdf.  SSI benefits are reduced dollar-for-dollar by So-
cial Security benefits. See id. at § 3-22 tbl.3-5, § 3-23 tbl.3-6.
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her SSDI income alone, unless she could marry again or prevail upon her
adult children for assistance.
Another striking feature of the family law/social insurance system is
that spousal support following divorce is frankly redistributive in a way that
social insurance may not be.  Tom’s spousal support represented redistribu-
tion from a better-off individual to a worse-off one, and it took place be-
tween two now-unrelated people hostile to each other.  But Elma’s SSDI
benefit to some degree represented a return of her own earlier payroll tax
contributions, which purchased retirement savings and an insurance contract
against disability.  To be sure, Social Security does redistribute income by
giving lower-wage workers a relative bargain compared to a purely actuarial
insurance premium.24  Still, Elma’s public benefits had a substantial private
component—just as if she were drawing down savings or had purchased
private disability insurance.
B. Spousal Support as Social Insurance
Putting family law and social welfare law together, we can see that the
nominally private tragedy of Wilson occurred amidst two legal sources of
social insurance: a family-law entitlement to spousal support and a public
entitlement to Social Security.  Stepping back from Wilson to generalize,
Table 1 depicts the combined family law/social welfare system for adults25
who develop disabilities.  The table describes the individual’s legally en-
forceable rights (and omits consideration of voluntary financial support and
care by affective partners, children, and others).
24 See Jeffrey B. Liebman, Redistribution in the Current Social Security System 1–2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8625, 2001) (noting the higher replacement
rates for low wage workers but noting that shorter life expectancy and other factors tend to
reduce the average redistribution from higher- to lower-wage workers).
25 Adults whose disabilities developed in childhood are treated as children for purposes of
Social Security: they qualify for benefits (or not) based on their parents’ earnings history. SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 05-10026, BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 10–11, availa-
ble at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10026.pdf.
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TABLE 1: FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL INSURANCE PROVISION FOR ADULTS
(UP TO AGE SIXTY-TWO) WITH DISABILITIES.26
Potential Benefits Potential Risks
Married • Individual’s spouse has • Spouse’s income is low or
unlimited, though minimally spouse withholds support or care
enforceable, obligation of (within legal boundaries).
support.27 • Individual has no young
• SSDI provides benefits based on children, eliminating SSDI
the individual’s own work spousal benefit.
history. • Individual is poor but not poor
• SSDI may provide additional enough to qualify for SSI.
benefits to the spouse if the
spouse is rearing the working
individual’s young children.
Divorced; • Spouse may have extended • Former spouse’s income too low
Performed obligation of support following for spousal support award.
Child-Rearing divorce. • Low SSDI payments due to
Work • SSDI provides benefits based on individual’s low earnings or
the individual’s own work intermittent work history.
history. • Individual is poor but not poor
enough to qualify for SSI.
Divorced; • Spouse may have time-limited • Former spouse’s income too low
Never obligation of support following for spousal support award.
Performed divorce. • Spousal support not awarded or
Child-Rearing • SSDI provides benefits based on terminates.
Work the individual’s own work • Low SSDI payments due to
history. individual’s low earnings or
intermittent work history.
• Individual is poor but not poor
enough to qualify for SSI.
Never Married • SSDI provides benefits based on • No legal claim for support from
the individual’s own work any former partners, except for
history. “palimony” claims.
• Low SSDI payments due to
individual’s low earnings or
intermittent work history.
• Individual is poor but not poor
enough to qualify for SSI.
Elma Wilson fell into one of the most vulnerable categories: she was
divorced after a short-term, childless marriage.  Her work and earnings
history qualified her for a modest SSDI benefit, so she was luckier than
those with lower earnings or a sporadic work record.  And Tom’s middle-
26 At age sixty-two, a disabled worker may qualify for a higher benefit based on her
spouse’s work history or the work history of a former spouse (if the marriage lasted ten years
or more and if the worker is at age sixty-two unmarried, even if remarried and divorced in the
intervening years).  42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006).
27 See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953); see also KRAUSE &
MEYER, supra note 18, at 91–93.
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class earnings supported an award of spousal support for nearly five years.
Taken together, Elma’s spousal support of $500 per month plus her Social
Security of $436 per month gave her $11,232 per year, or just above 200%
of the poverty line and less than half the median income.  Still, even that
income left Elma at a far lower standard of living than middle-class Tom,
whose $38,400 income28 put him at over 700% of the poverty line and at
150% of the median income of $24,897.29  The termination of spousal
support left Elma in severe economic distress—below the poverty line.
Treating family law as social insurance may seem to gloss over legal
and substantive differences in the two regimes.  After all, Tom is Elma’s ex-
husband, not a stranger; he is supporting his former life partner, not paying
taxes to the state.  But these distinctions—like most legal dualisms—are
overstated.  The law mandated Tom’s obligations, just as it sets the terms of
taxation.  After the divorce, Tom was in some sense a stranger to Elma—he
no longer had day-to-day obligations toward her.  And both he and the
courts framed his spousal support very much as an income “tax”—a
financial burden calibrated by Tom’s income to pay for someone else’s
benefit.  The court ultimately concluded that the tax on Tom weighed too
heavily and should be spread more widely.  On Elma’s side, as we have seen,
her seemingly public benefits had a substantial private component, since
SSDI reflects payroll tax contributions as well as state subsidies (and the
amount of the subsidy varies from positive to negative—some people
receive less, in actuarial terms, than if they had purchased a private
insurance policy).
On the benefits side, we can also analyze spousal support in the same
terms we would use for a social insurance program.  Table 2 compares
spousal support and SSDI along six dimensions.
28 In 1986, Tom had $2,200 per month in salary and $1,000 in Navy retirement. In re
Marriage of Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 522, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
29 See U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables: Table H-6, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/histinc/h06ar.html (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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TABLE 2: COMPARING SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND SSDI.
Spousal Support SSDI
Categorical • Formal marriage.30 • Permanent, severe disability.
• Lengthy marriage. • Work history.
• Childcare or other sacrifice of
earning power.
Work Test • Support may be reduced or • Benefits cease if employable.31
eliminated if employable.
Means Test • Need for support taken into • No.
account along with earnings
capability.
Eligibility • Individualized determination by • Individualized disability
Determination a judge (unless a negotiated determination by caseworkers
contract is valid). and an Administrative Law
Judge.
Time Limit • Yes, particularly if a short • No.
marriage, if no children, and if
no demonstrable sacrifice to
build the spouse’s earning
power.
Conditional on • Yes. • No.
an Ex-Spouse’s
Income
Table 2 suggests substantial similarities.  Both spousal support and
SSDI are legally enforceable entitlements, not voluntary transfers.  Both are
categorical programs with individualized eligibility determinations.  Both
terminate support when the recipient is—or could be—self-supporting
through employment.  In the end, both family law and Social Security pro-
vide cash transfers that may meet the needs of people with disabilities—or
fall short of meeting need, depending on the circumstances.
One important legal distinction between the two regimes does not ap-
pear in Table 2.  Spousal support can be negotiated, either before the mar-
riage in a prenuptial agreement or at divorce in a separation agreement.
Depending on state law, the substantive terms of the agreement, and the
situation of the parties, these private agreements may be enforceable, which
is to say they can negate application of the default rules applied in Wilson.32
By contrast, SSDI taxes are mandatory for nearly all U.S. workers, and there
is no opportunity for customization by contract.  This formal difference is
30 Support obligations to unmarried ex-partners are recognized by the law, but outcomes
vary, depending on the state and the degree to which the parties made express promises of
support. See KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 18, at 67–73.
31 See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra note 23, § 1, available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/ssgb.pdf (discussing substantial gainful
employment rules and exceptions).
32 See KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 18, at 81–87, 337–42 (explaining the general legal
conditions for upholding antenuptial and separation agreements).
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probably less significant than it may first appear, however, to the extent that
the parties bargain in the shadow of the baseline entitlements set by the law.
The conventional distinction between private and public benefits may
rest on the entries in the last column on the right.  An individual’s entitle-
ment to spousal support depends on the ex-spouse’s income, while the enti-
tlement to SSDI does not.  To be sure, the distinction is not entirely crisp.  If
an ex-spouse is sufficiently well-off, his income is not a major limitation on
the claimant’s benefit.  And not all social welfare programs are entitlements:
block grants, for instance, may deny services to eligible individuals simply
because government funding falls short of demand.
Still, in the ordinary range of cases, the distinction has some bite: if the
ex-spouse is poor, even the most deserving claimant for spousal support will
walk away with nothing.  Put another way, the family law portion of the
social insurance system awards entitlements of varying “credit quality”—
those formally married to rich partners have AAA-quality claims, while
others have financially contingent entitlements.33
The two systems of social insurance—family law and Social Security—
each take account of the other, but the legal mechanisms are different.  Fam-
ily courts generally may (or must) take need into account in determining
spousal support, as in Wilson; and so Elma’s SSDI entitlement would tend to
reduce her spousal support, all else equal.  But, just as in Wilson, when the
entitlement to spousal support ends, the spouse’s level of income becomes
irrelevant.  The Wilson decision left Elma below the federal poverty line—a
measure social scientists view as representing dire poverty.34  The court does
not mention the poverty level, nor does it recognize that living below the
poverty line likely means severe deprivation.  Instead, the appellate court
endorses the trial court’s conclusion that Elma’s well-being is now the state’s
obligation—without giving much consideration to the content of that
obligation.
By contrast, SSDI benefits are set without a means test for the recipient
and so do not explicitly take account of other income.  Implicitly, however,
SSDI sets benefits for some workers low enough that, to escape poverty,
beneficiaries functionally must maintain or form a family relationship—or
make a successful claim on an ex-spouse.
To summarize, the law creates a combined system of social insurance
that distributes the risk of disability in a distinctive way: all else equal, high-
earning workers with intact marriages (or divorces after long-term, child-
rearing marriages) to high earners receive the largest benefits awards.  Low-
earning workers (without children) whose marriages dissolve fare less well,
and low-earning, never-married workers have the fewest legal protections.
33 A parallel insight in the child support context led Irwin Garfinkel to propose child
support assurance, in which parents would pay child support determined under standard rules,
but if parents could not pay, the state would top up so that the child received the full amount.
Garfinkel termed the proposal an “addition” to Social Security. GARFINKEL, supra note 3, at
51.
34 See Alstott, supra note 16, at 7–10.
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Analyzed from an ex ante perspective, Elma Wilson was vulnerable
long before her fall in 1980.  Given her marital situation, her child-rearing
situation, and her earnings, she faced substantial financial risk if divorce or
disability struck.  Had her low wages been connected to child-rearing duties
or a long marriage, she could have fared better in the family-law portion of
the system (qualifying for long-term spousal support).  And had her earnings
been higher, she could have fared better in the public, SSDI portion of the
system (qualifying for higher benefits).35
Perhaps it is not surprising that high-income people with long-term
marriages and traditional gender roles fare best under both family law and
Social Security.  The law often perpetuates privilege and reproduces under-
lying inequalities.  Still, an integrated view of family law and SSDI helps us
see the extent to which the social insurance system as a whole mitigates—or
fails to mitigate—the risks created by marriage and the labor market.
Both family law and Social Security allocate the consequences of life
risks amidst other legal structures that entrench privilege and vulnerability.
Consider two elements of U.S. law that we often take for granted.  First, U.S.
labor and employment laws influenced Elma’s work history and working
conditions.  Bartending tends to pay relatively low wages and provide few
benefits; thus, Elma apparently was left without access to the third portion of
the U.S. social insurance system—private insurance benefits for disability
and retirement.  We sometimes speak of the labor market as if it exists in
some natural space outside law.  But economists know that the law struc-
tures market interactions.  Thus, there are multiple possible forms of a
“free” labor market, corresponding to an array of possible legal-institutional
choices about matters like collective bargaining and legal mandates for
wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, and so on.36
Second, Elma’s disability and marital breakup occurred amidst a legal
context that required her—and nearly everyone else—to purchase most
goods in the marketplace at prices set by the market.  Housing, food, cloth-
ing, and transportation all had to be funded after the Wilson ruling out of
Elma’s $436 per month SSDI benefit.  We have already seen that Elma was
unlikely to qualify for SSI, and without children she could not collect feder-
ally sponsored welfare benefits (then called Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), and now called TANF).  The major supplemental benefit
she would receive was Medicare, which would, after a waiting period, pay
for a major portion (though not all) of Elma’s medical care.37
35 When a worker is disabled, his or her spouse may also claim derivative benefits if he or
she is still married, under age sixty-two, and caring for children or if married or divorced and
age sixty-two or over.
36 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN, AMERICA WORKS 7–19 (2007).
37 The court in Wilson noted that the initial spousal support order included medical insur-
ance coverage. In re Marriage of Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 522, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).  The
opinion does not clarify the terms of the insurance or whether it continued when Elma became
Medicare eligible.
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C. Legal Reforms: Family Law and Beyond
Armed with this map of family law, SSDI, and other legal structures,
we can now see at least four entry points for legal reforms.  Changes in
family law, in Social Security, in labor markets, and in the distribution of
primary goods could all change the tragic nature of the court’s choice in
Wilson by altering the ex ante distribution of the risks of disability and/or
marital dissolution.  To be sure, I have not—and will not here—offer a nor-
mative argument that would support any specific reform, or indeed any re-
form at all.  My goal here is not to prescribe the proper form of the social
insurance system; rather, I mean only to offer options for discussion that
illustrate some counterintuitive legal choices.
Family law represents one avenue for reform.  In response to Wilson,
the courts or legislatures might mandate longer-lasting obligations for
spousal support when severe disability and extreme need combine.  Instead
of distinguishing between child-rearing marriages, on the one hand, and
companionate marriages, on the other, the law might—contrary to the ap-
proach the court adopted in Wilson—treat all marriages as an explicit form
of social insurance against disability, with marital obligations lasting for a
lengthy, even permanent, time after divorce.
This direction for legal reform would, of course, mark a major change
in the present understanding of marriage and divorce.  At present, divorce
offers a fresh start, with the exception being long-term, child-rearing mar-
riages with one spouse shouldering the care work and sacrificing market
opportunities.  Changing the result in Wilson would usher in a new approach,
and one that raises many questions.  At present, the United States has a high
degree of serial monogamy, with a high rate of divorce and remarriage.38
Extending the alimony obligation could stand at odds with that cultural pat-
tern, tying ex-spouses together financially for the long term.  And of course,
there is the deeper normative question: should marriage involve long-term
income insurance by each spouse to the other?  Operational questions arise
as well: Should very short marriages be excepted?  Should spouses be per-
mitted to opt out via prenuptial agreements?
I do not offer here a concrete proposal for legal reform.  Instead, my
limited point at this stage is that we can conceive of such a change in social-
insurance terms.  An extended alimony obligation would award a longer-
term, means-tested benefit to the ex-spouse suffering a disability, funded by
an income “tax” on her former spouse.
The SSDI program is another candidate for legal reform.  Higher SSDI
benefits would improve the situation of people with disabilities—and, along
the way, set a higher floor for the loss of other income, including spousal
support.  Alternatively, the program could adopt an income-tested supple-
ment—or could expand SSI benefits.  Such a change would, of course, pull
SSDI in the direction of becoming a welfare program, a direction that many
38 See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND 4–5 (2009).
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defenders of Social Security have (historically) rejected for political
reasons.39
A different approach would alter SSDI to pay more to those without
family and less to those who can count on family financial support.  That
approach would not require a full-scale means test, which is administratively
complex and carries the whiff of welfare that Social Security supporters fear.
Instead, the benefits schedule could simply be adjusted in some rough way
to reflect the presence or absence of another adult in the household.  This
reform would stand in tension with Social Security’s traditional approach,
which treats a second adult in the family as a dependent rather than a source
of support.  Today, SSDI today pays more to a married couple than to an
unmarried worker if the worker’s spouse is caring for the worker’s minor
children.40
Adjusting benefits categorically for the presence or absence of family
might or might not be a desirable direction, and I do not attempt here to
articulate the normative case for it or to work out administrative details.
(Would any other adult count as providing family support, even if the rela-
tionship is short-term, informal, or self-consciously casual?  Would such a
rule authorize intrusions into personal privacy?)  Instead, the point is to
question the assumptions about family life built into our social insurance
system: today, the primary concern is for workers unable to support depen-
dents.  There is a blind spot—or perhaps a deliberate gap—for those who
work but are not well-off and who neither support dependents nor qualify for
support by anyone else.
Looking beyond formal social insurance programs, changes in deeper
legal structures could also change the stakes in cases like Wilson.  Labor
market changes, ranging from collective bargaining that could raise wages to
legal mandates for fringe benefits, could improve Elma’s financial profile
and her access to private, supplemental disability insurance.  Programs that
weaken the link between market income and access to primary goods could
also help Elma’s SSDI check stretch further: expanded housing and transpor-
tation assistance, for example, would change the significance of the SSDI
benefit, transforming it into a meaningful cash supplement after basic neces-
sities are provided for, rather than a woefully inadequate all-in-one benefit.
In the end, the private tragedy of Wilson reflects public decisions about
the distribution of social risks.  Without children, without a long marriage,
and with limited earnings, Elma’s risk profile was dire: disability, especially
in combination with divorce, meant financial disaster.
39 See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA’S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE
156–60 (1990).
40 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2007).
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II. BROWN V. BROWN: CHILD SUPPORT AND MULTIPLE FAMILIES
Family law frames child support, too, as a private matter.  Parents have
an obligation to support their children, and when parents default, children
must suffer.  Or so it seems.
To be sure, the state will intervene to place children in foster care in
cases of severe hunger or dire physical danger.  But within a wide range, the
law permits parental choices to govern children’s living conditions.  A Wis-
consin case, Brown v. Brown,41 illustrates the problems that arise when di-
vorced or never-married parents remarry and start a second family—and
parental earnings cannot adequately support both.
A. The Tragedy: Divorce and Multiple Families
Sheldon and Sharon Brown married in 1984 and divorced three years
later.  Sharon took custody of their child.  Wisconsin guidelines required
Sheldon to pay seventeen percent of his gross income in child support.
Later, Sheldon remarried and had three children with his new wife, and he
petitioned the courts for a reduction in his child support payments due to his
obligation to support his new children. The appellate court denied the peti-
tion, holding that the Wisconsin rules for “serial family payers” could not be
applied to reduce support owed to an earlier-born child.42
Brown v. Brown does not initially seem to present the heart-wrenching
tragedy of Wilson.  The appellate court’s opinion offers only a spare recita-
tion of facts and devotes most of its analysis to the language and structure of
the Wisconsin child support guidelines.  The opinion does not reveal
whether Sharon or Sheldon or their respective families were well-off or eco-
nomically marginal.  It is not clear whether Sheldon’s second family was
having trouble making ends meet—or whether Sheldon was just taking ad-
vantage of a legal loophole that could reduce his child support.
Still, there is a private tragedy lurking here, and it has divided courts
across the country.43  The nature of the tragedy emerges in the few
paragraphs the Brown appellate opinion devotes to policy.  Sheldon, the
court emphasizes, has made a (bad) choice, and it is “good public policy”
for him to bear the financial consequences: “a parent’s voluntary reduction
41 Brown v. Brown, 503 N.W.2d 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
42 Id. at 281.
43 See Martha Minow, How Should We Think About Child Support Obligations?, in FA-
THERS UNDER FIRE 302, 302 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998). For a summary of several
states’ approaches to multiple families, see Emma Casper, Review of Child Support Policies
for Multiple Family Obligations (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Harvard Law School Library), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/cspol-
icy/pdfs/Caspar-Task4A-2006.pdf. See also Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Multiple Families,
Multiple Goals, Multiple Failures, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 109, 111, 152–63 (2009) (propos-
ing a system of “limited equalization” that would steer a middle path).
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of the ability to support a family by having more children should not auto-
matically penalize the earlier born children.”44
But, as in every private tragedy, there is another side to the story: what
about the second wife and the second set of children?  Consider, for in-
stance, a New York case, Lonsdale v. McEwen.45  After a second marriage
and the birth of twins, Mark McEwen petitioned the courts to reduce the
child support he owed to a child from his first marriage.  A sympathetic
appellate court ordered a hearing on the merits, concluding that
“[r]egardless of whether defendant [father] can fairly be blamed for remar-
rying and raising children with his new spouse . . . his infant sons are blame-
less and [the trial court] should not have been so dismissive of defendant’s
need to provide for them.”46
Working within the zero-sum constraint, the law has typically endorsed
one of two approaches, which Martha Minow terms “first families first” and
“equal treatment.”47  “First families first” is the approach adopted in Brown:
the law gives priority to the financial needs of the first-born set of children.
The “equal treatment” approach, by contrast, emphasizes the equality of ear-
lier- and later-born children and seeks to equalize their standard of living.48
Any aspiration to equalization raises numerous questions: for instance,
should a stepparent’s earnings be taken into account in the equalization cal-
culation?49  Still, the aspiration to equalize living standards across the first
and second family contrasts, in concept, with “first families first.”
Just as in Wilson, then, the problem of supporting multiple families
seems to pose an insoluble dilemma created by bad luck and bad choices.
When parents do not earn enough to support two families, the law cannot
create something out of nothing.  Either one set of children wins at the ex-
pense of the other, or else the law splits a less-than-adequate income be-
tween the two families, spreading equal suffering to both.
B. Child Support as Social Insurance
But, as in Wilson, a closer look suggests that family law and social
insurance operate together to determine which choices are risky and which
are safe.  Table 3 outlines the major legal rules and the risks they create from
a child’s perspective.
44 Brown, 503 N.W.2d at 283.
45 Lonsdale v. McEwen, 821 N.Y.S.2d 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
46 Id. at 158.
47 See Minow, supra note 43, at 309.
48 See, e.g., Lonsdale, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (holding that the birth of twins to a father’s
current family constitutes an unanticipated event with concomitant need, potentially justifying
a downward revision in the payments required by a support agreement entered into with the
mother of a child from a prior marriage).
49 See Ira Mark Ellman & Tara O’Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support, 45 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 107, 153–59 (2008).
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TABLE 3: FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR CHILDREN.
Potential Benefits Potential Risks
Child of • Both parents have a legal • Parents do not earn enough to
Married obligation to support the child. support their children.
Parents • The state provides a free public • Parents fail to (or cannot)
education of varying quality. provide care.
• Small, time-limited welfare
benefits are available if the
family encounters dire poverty,




• Small per-child tax benefits.
• Social Security provides benefits
to the parents and the child if a
parent dies or suffers a severe
disability, contingent on the
parent’s work history.
Child of • Both parents have a legal • Custodial parent has low
Divorced or obligation to support the child, income, and noncustodial parent
Never-Married subject to legal process (the has low income or fails to pay
Parents custodial parent must obtain a child support.
court order). • Custodial parent fails to (or
• Depending on state law, a cannot) provide care.
parent’s second family may • Noncustodial parent fails to
reduce support payable to a first provide care and in-kind
set of children. support.
• Small, time-limited welfare • A custodial or noncustodial
benefits are available if the parent has multiple families and
family encounters dire poverty, insufficient income to support
plus food stamps and possibly them both (depending on state
SCHIP. law, this risk may fall on one
• Small per-child tax benefits. set of children or both).
• Social Security provides benefits
to the parents and the child if a
parent dies or suffers a severe
disability, contingent on the
parent’s earnings history.
Family breakup, low income, and serial families thus create financial
risks for children.  Parental unwillingness or incapacity to provide care cre-
ates a risk of neglect.  The U.S. social insurance system offers few protec-
tions for these risks.  A free K–12 public education ensures at least minimal
access to basic education, but housing prices correlate with school quality,
and postsecondary schooling is costly.  Small, largely symbolic tax credits
provide, at most, a few thousand dollars, and time-limited, means-tested
TANF benefits assist only families in dire circumstances.  For children, these
financial risks pose developmental risks, since poverty can lead to nutritional
deprivation, health deprivation, and stress that adversely affect develop-
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ment.50  The child welfare system is notoriously poor at detecting neglect
until it reaches major proportions and is obvious to outsiders; the system
relies on third-party reports and, even when neglect is reported, the state
may not act absent immediate grave danger.51
By contrast, Social Security provides greater financial support when a
child’s parent dies or suffers a severe disability, provided that the parent had
a sufficient history of paid work and earnings.  SSDI pays monthly benefits
not only to the worker but also to her minor children, even if the parent is
noncustodial, and so does Social Security Survivors Insurance (a form of
public life insurance purchased with the same payroll taxes that fund the
more familiar Social Security Old Age and Disability Insurance program).
Just as in Wilson, this distribution of risk also reflects other elements of
the law.  The law structures labor markets with few protections for workers:
in these markets, some parents earn low wages and face few options for
improving their earnings.  And the law consigns to another marketplace the
allocation of primary goods like health care, food, and shelter.  Taken to-
gether, the labor market and the market for goods create predictable vulnera-
bility for low-earning parents and for parents with high costs of living.
C. Legal Reform: Family Law and Beyond
Just as in Wilson, a comprehensive map of the legal landscape helps
highlight several entry points for legal reform.  The following discussion
assumes—without justifying—the objective of ensuring adequate material
support for all children.52  A different goal would, of course, motivate differ-
ent reforms; the following analysis serves just to illustrate the kinds of ques-
tions one might ask.
Typical discussions treat the level of support required of noncustodial
parents as the primary variable for family law reform.  Given that assump-
tion, and accepting the constraint of parental income as the sole source of
funds available for children, the equal treatment approach seems to serve the
goal of material equality for children.  If the motivating norm is equal regard
for all children, the policy implication would be to define parental resources
broadly (including, for instance, the earnings of new spouses) and equalize
the living standard for both sets of children.53
50 There is a large literature establishing a connection between poverty and poor health,
poor academic achievement, and risks of school dropout and early child bearing. See, e.g.,
CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997)
(offering a collection of essays establishing the effects of poverty on child development).
There is debate among social scientists about the extent to which poverty itself causes these
outcomes and whether income transfers alone could reverse them. See generally SUSAN E.
MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY (1997).
51 JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION, at chs. 1–2 (1998).
52 For a normative argument for equality of developmental resources, see Anne L. Alstott,
Is the Family at Odds With Equality? The Legal Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2008).
53 See Minow, supra note 43, at 316.  For a discussion of the complexities of an aspiration
to equal treatment, see Ellman & Ellman, supra note 49.
\\server05\productn\H\HLP\4-1\HLP101.txt unknown Seq: 21 11-FEB-10 16:32
2010] Family Law as Social Insurance 23
But equal regard for all children stands at odds with the limitation of
child support to parental income.  Recognition of children’s blamelessness
militates in favor of adequate developmental resources for each child, a goal
served uneasily when legal reform is constrained by parental income and
when it takes as its benchmark an ad hoc measure like the first family’s
original or later standard of living, or the second family’s current one.
The law might respond by loosening the budget constraint, for instance
by expanding the circle of adults with financial responsibility for children.
The law could, in principle, obligate stepparents and grandparents or even
aunts and uncles to contribute to a child’s support.  This nontraditional ap-
proach would push family law further along the spectrum toward taxation, to
be sure, and would pose questions of fairness, incentives, and administra-
tion.  Would it be fair to require a financial contribution from people who
had chosen not to have children?  Would the system discourage remarriage?
Would the legal apparatus now in place for “deadbeat dads” have to ramp
up to pursue “deadbeat grandmas” and “absconding aunts”?  Or might a
broader legal support obligation improve children’s welfare while spreading
the financial burden in a way that lessens pressure on parents?
Another reform might be to obligate children themselves to contribute
to their support.  Rest assured that I am not proposing child labor or an
Oliver Twist-type workhouse.  Instead, the law could conceptualize chil-
dren’s support as something to be supplied by the state during childhood and
paid back by the adult over her lifetime.  Many designs are possible: Should
the state/child pay the full amount of her support, or only any shortfall in
what the family can provide?  Should the grown person be liable for a fixed
debt, repayable even at the cost of financial distress?  Or should she have to
repay her support only if her income comfortably permits it, perhaps via an
income tax?
I will not offer here a full analysis of either an extended-family support
obligation or an intertemporal transfer to children from their adult selves.
Both reforms seem radical, but both illustrate a conceptual point.  Under-
standing family law as social insurance reveals—and calls into question—
the assumption that only parents should contribute to a child’s support.
Shifting the support obligation to an extended family or to the child herself
illustrates that child support funding can have a narrow base (two parents
only) or a broader one (parents plus extended family) or the broadest one
(the state, which is to say some larger group of taxpayers).
A second legal lever for reform is the formal social insurance system.
Here, the law operates outside the constraint of parental earning power, and
so it can more readily achieve financial equality—or a decent minimum—
for all children.  Irwin Garfinkel has proposed a system of “child support
assurance,” which would guarantee each child of divorced or unmarried par-
ents a fixed minimum child support payment.54  The child support would be
funded by the noncustodial parent in the first instance, but if the parent
54 GARFINKEL, supra note 3.
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failed to pay (whether because of inability or unwillingness), the state would
pay for each child up to the minimum benefit. Garfinkel termed his proposal
an addition to Social Security,55 and he argued that the program would ad-
dress children’s risks arising from divorce, nonmarriage, nonpayment of
child support, and parental poverty.56  Garfinkel’s idea was both to improve
child support collections (an agenda that has been widely adopted since the
initial publication of his idea) and to supplement parental contributions (an
idea that has proved less popular).57
Garfinkel’s proposal does not fit neatly into family law or social insur-
ance.  Child support assurance would require a legal determination of child
support by a court, and the level of payments would be based on parental
income and a standard child-support formula.  Thus, as in family law, par-
ents would remain the primary obligors, and actual child support amounts
could vary among children.  Only the minimum would be fixed, ensuring
that each child would receive something, even if parents could pay but
evaded their responsibility.
Garfinkel’s proposal could, of course, be expanded to cover children in
all families whose parents—whether absent or present—cannot provide the
children with adequate support.  Garfinkel declined to extend his program in
this direction: he aimed to address only the problem of child support for
children whose parents are divorced or unmarried, and he deliberately
sought some distance from traditional welfare.58  The cost, of course, is that
child support assurance could leave children of poor, divorced, or unmarried
parents better off than children of poor, married ones.
Legal reforms might also look to other elements of the law.  Today, a
child’s opportunities and access to primary goods depend heavily on her par-
ents’ market earnings.  The law could change labor market structures to raise
wages and improve working conditions at the bottom;59 additional reforms
might improve the labor market position of parents engaged in care work.60
Yet another approach would seek to weaken, even sever, the link be-
tween parental earning power and children’s access to primary goods.  It
would be possible, for instance, for the state to guarantee a universal set of
primary goods—housing, food, clothing, medical care, supplemental child
care—to every child, without regard to parental income.  Such a system
would transform the obligations of parenthood, removing the component of
financial responsibility while retaining the emotional, social, and moral re-
sponsibilities of the role.  This is, of course, a radical idea in the American
context, though less so compared to European welfare states, which provide
55 Id. at 51.
56 Id. at 50–55.
57 See Thomas Corbett, The Wisconsin Child Support Assurance System: From Plausible
Proposals to Improbable Prospects, in CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE 27, 27–29 (Irwin Garfin-
kel et al. eds., 1992).
58 GARFINKEL, supra note 3, at 50–51.
59 See FREEMAN, supra note 36, at 141–48.
60 See JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP 15–66 (2000).
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more generous support for children.61  In other work, I have addressed in
some detail the justifications for such a system as well as objections to it.62
Like Elma Wilson, children of parents with low earnings and multiple
families live with a high level of risk long before disaster strikes.  A child
whose parents do not earn enough to support two families is vulnerable to
family breakup, if she is in the first family, or to the existence of a prior
family, if she is in the second one.  The deprivation such children experience
reflects not only parental choices and luck but also the allocation of risks
mandated by law.  Adults, too, face risks determined by law.  Present law
casts nonpaying parents with multiple families as “deadbeat parents” who
“victimize[ ]” their children.63  But the tragic nature of such situations re-
flects the legal distribution of financial responsibility for children.  In a legal
system that guaranteed adequate developmental resources for all children,
we would no longer make parental success depend on parents’ fate in the
labor markets.  In such a system, even low-earning parents could succeed in
their chosen role, and a deadbeat would be one who abandons or neglects his
children rather than one who fails to pay.
III. CONCLUSION: FAMILY DISRUPTION AND SOCIAL INSURANCE
By tradition, family law and social insurance occupy different legal
fields.  Family law, taught in one set of courses, focuses on the adjudication
of tragic cases.  A typical family law course illustrates in exhaustive (and
emotionally exhausting) fashion the range of risks that can destroy family
life.  Divorce, parental exit, mental illness, poverty, disability, substance
abuse, domestic violence—all can produce financial and personal ruin.
Social insurance, if taught at all in American law schools, is taught in a
course on social welfare policy or poverty law or in a clinical setting.  Aca-
demic courses focus on the rules insuring workers against work disruption
due to unemployment, disability, and early death.  The central problem for
the law, it often seems, is moral hazard: how can programs cushion risk
without encouraging workers to take risky jobs, forgo training, prolong un-
employment, or exaggerate disability?64
In this Essay, I have suggested that family law can be understood as
one part of the social insurance system and that scholars can apply some of
the same analytical tools and categories used in social insurance to family
law. Wilson and Brown illustrate how the two systems operate together to
61 See Alstott, supra note 16, at 19–20 (summarizing comparative data on public support
for working-age parents and their children).
62 Alstott, supra note 52.
63 See, e.g., State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, ¶¶ 9, 20, 45 Wis 2d 447, 629 N.W.2d 200.
64 See Jerry L. Mashaw & Virginia Reno, Social Security Disability Insurance: A Policy
Review, in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 245, 247 (Terry Thomason et
al. eds., 1998) (summarizing data finding poor economic outcomes among people who claim
disability insurance benefits but are found ineligible); Alstott, supra note 16, at 19 (summariz-
ing data on the prevalence of work-related disability among people not receiving SSI or SSDI).
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distribute the risks of disability and family disruption—and how changes in
either regime might alter that risk profile.
The analysis here also raises the question whether the concerns animat-
ing family law might have important application to social insurance.  Family
law puts front and center the risks of disruptions in two functions of the
family—financial support and hands-on care.  When families dissolve or fail
to form, or when seemingly intact families fail to fulfill the responsibilities
of support and care assigned to them by law, tragedy can result.
In an ongoing project, I ask whether social insurance could and should
do more to recognize and address disruptions in affective life.  Social insur-
ance now insures the role of worker/breadwinner, and benefits aim to re-
place lost paychecks.  But disruptions in affective life can have
consequences just as serious as those of work disruption.
The law often presumes that individuals exist within families.  As in
Elma Wilson’s case, social insurance benefits for individuals, including
SSDI, are often inadequate in amount—absent family contributions.  Family
law presumes that spouses in an ongoing marriage provide financial and
hands-on care.65  And parents are presumed to be fit custodians absent strong
proof to the contrary.66  These legal presumptions often operate even when
family is absent or fails to fulfill its functions, with dire consequences for
adults and for children’s development.67
To be sure, current law cushions family disruption to varying degrees,
depending on circumstances.  Social Security, in particular, is a major source
of financial support for families, but it does not—because it is not designed
to—address financial shortfalls that arise from sources other than work dis-
ruption.  A working-age person without disabilities has no claim on the sys-
tem, even if she is unable to support herself or her dependents due to family
disruption. Beyond social insurance, a variety of means-tested programs as-
sist families and children that fall into poverty.  Parents (whether divorced or
not) can turn to TANF or general assistance if poverty is dire.  Medicaid and
SCHIP expansions offer health insurance to many poor and near-poor chil-
65 See Rosenbury, supra note 5, at 191.
66 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
67 See Adam P. Romero, Living Alone: New Demographic Research, in TRANSCENDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW (Martha A. Fineman ed., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3–4, on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).  For an illustration of the consequences of the law’s
presumption of parental fitness, see, for example, In re Eden F., 741 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1999)
(terminating the parental rights of a mentally-ill mother of a child with special needs).  For
years, the child, Eden, bounced between foster homes and her mother’s care.  Special education
and other services were often disrupted, and the mother received inadequate treatment for her
own mental illness and inadequate support services during attempts at reunification.  By the
time the termination case reached the courts, Eden had developed an attachment disorder—a
lasting emotional disability with potentially severe consequences.  Although the mother, by the
court’s account, sincerely loved her child, she needed significant support due to her disability.
Existing social insurance protections—a patchwork of SSI, foster care, Medicaid, and school-
based special education—failed the child and the mother too.
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dren.68  SSI for the elderly and disabled and state general assistance pro-
grams as well as food stamps also assist the poor.  General and special
education programs also supplement parental care for children.  But, once
again, these are generalized anti-poverty programs rather than tailored ef-
forts to address the absence or dysfunction of family.
One preliminary insight, which merits further exploration, builds on the
idea of the two-tier welfare state often invoked in discussions of women’s
care work.69  Present law accords family disruption—like care work—a
lower priority and a lesser status, offering patchwork protections that address
only dire poverty.  In the case of failures of family care, adults have no legal
claim to care unless the absence of care leads to a medically-cognizable
condition that authorizes hospitalization or nursing home care.  Failures of
family care for children—child neglect—theoretically trigger state action,
but in practice neglect must be severe, lasting, detectable by an outsider, and
acted upon by the state, with many gaps in the system.70
Perhaps current protections are sufficient: perhaps it is adequate simply
to protect against the direst form of poverty.  But it begs the important nor-
mative questions: Should people be insured against family failure only at the
poverty level?  Or should they have some claim to a higher standard of liv-
ing or less-stigmatizing support?
The same questions arise in traditional, employment-related social in-
surance, and in that context, society offers a different response.  When a
breadwinner retires or suffers disability or early death, his fate triggers an
array of standard social insurance protections that aim not only to keep him
out of poverty but to prevent a massive drop in living standard.71  The bene-
68 For data on health insurance coverage, see U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey (CPS): Table HI02, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/macro/032008/health/h02_001.
htm (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey (CPS): Table HI03, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/macro/032008/health/h03_001.
htm (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey (CPS): Table HI04, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/macro/032008/health/h04_001.
htm (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
69 See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED 293–99 (1994) (describing a di-
chotomy in U.S. social provision between social insurance and public assistance). But see
CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS 29–31 (2007) (arguing that the
two-tier claim exaggerates differences among social welfare programs).
70 See WALDFOGEL, supra note 51, at chs. 1–2.
71 As Elma Wilson’s case demonstrates, the system does not necessarily operate in quite
that way for every earner; but for workers with long-term stable earnings, the system today
provides an above-poverty-level income.  In 2007, a long-term minimum-wage worker would
have received a monthly benefit of $845.70 or an annual benefit of $10,148 at retirement.  A
worker earning seventy-five percent of average earnings would receive $13,922 per year at
retirement. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY POLICY: BULLETIN
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (2008), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supple-
ment/2008/2a20-2a28.html#table2.a20 (follow “Table 2.A26” hyperlink) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).  The 2007 poverty threshold for one person (over age sixty-
five) was $9,944.  U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Thresholds for 2007, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh07.html (on file with the Harvard Law School library).  For
a long-term low earner, Social Security now replaces about sixty percent of the retired
worker’s wages. See Patricia P. Martin, Comparing Replacement Rates Under Private and
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ficiaries include the worker, his young children, his spouse (if children are
young), and possibly his former spouse(s).  The benefits are funded as an
entitlement by the federal government, and they are awarded as a package by
a single agency.  Not every disabled or retired worker qualifies;72 but bene-
fits are relatively generous for those who do.
Feminists have challenged present social insurance on two primary
grounds.  First, they have noted that Social Security takes as its model a
long-married breadwinner with a long-term, stable work history and a de-
pendent spouse.  Scholars have pointed out that wives in two-earner couples
pay disproportionately high taxes and that women whose work history in-
cludes periods of unpaid care work may qualify for lower benefits.73  Sec-
ond, scholars have noted that unemployment insurance and Social Security
do not protect against work disruption due to family care obligations.74
Feminists have also labored to improve the status of women after di-
vorce.  Although the magnitude of financial distress suffered by women after
divorce is contested, family dissolution does seem to produce long-term dis-
advantage.  A large literature extending over several decades has proposed
reforms in family-law rules governing alimony, property division, and child
support.75
By contrast, my project will consider whether social insurance should
address family disruption directly.  There is some overlap with existing con-
cerns: insurance for disruptions in affective life would assist care workers
who find themselves without family support—like the divorced, never mar-
ried, and widowed women identified as needy by the first set of scholars.
But social insurance for disruption in family life would challenge the work-
disruption model rather than work within it.  It would also call attention to a
broader class of people, addressing not only care workers but also people
who depend on family financial support and care work.
In the broadest terms, then, my question is whether the law could and
should expand the social roles and risks that qualify for social insurance
beyond the role of worker and the risks of work disruption.  Would it be
Federal Retirement Systems, 65 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 1 (2003/04), available at http://www.
ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n1/v65n1p17.html.
72 See Mashaw & Reno, supra note 64, at 247.
73 Existing protections for care workers presume a long marriage to a male breadwinner, a
presumption increasingly at odds with the realities of many women’s lives.  The result is that
never-married, divorced, and widowed women often find themselves with less security than
others.  Scholars have proposed to integrate care work into the employment-based model of
social insurance—for instance, by offering earnings credit in Social Security for years spent in
care work.
74 Leaving work to care for a child or a spouse, for example, has traditionally disqualified
the worker for unemployment compensation.  National family leave benefits cover only about
half the workforce and provide only unpaid leave. See U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and
Hour Division: Appendix A1 Tables, http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/APPX-A-1-TABLES.htm
(scroll to Table A1-3.1) (on file with the Harvard Law School library).  Scholars have pro-
posed to expand paid family leave and child care assistance programs.
75 See generally AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANAL-
YSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2000).
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feasible, would it be desirable, and what would it mean to enact social insur-
ance to protect adults and children expressly against the risks of disruptions
in affective life?
A host of normative and technocratic issues come to mind.  Some might
object that people bring family disruption on themselves through personal
choices—to marry despite incompatibility, to have children on a limited in-
come, or to depend on an undependable partner.  Would it be fair to expect
people with different religious or personal beliefs about family to subsidize
one another’s most intimate decisions?  Would it be fair to burden successful
families with the outcomes of ill-advised or risky unions?  What would ben-
efits look like?  How can the state insure against an event as common as
divorce—and what would benefits look like?  What form of taxation should
support the system?
Moral hazard represents another major challenge: Would people marry
and divorce too casually, further endangering the fragile American family?
Would people have children too readily?  Would the system rely on formal
relationships—like marriage, divorce, and parenthood—or would it attempt
to recognize other relationships of support and care, and if so how?
And what about people without families?  The health care and social
welfare systems, just to take two examples, often assume that individuals
have family members prepared to advocate for their interests and provide
hands-on care.76  But what about individuals who lack family support?  The
law presently treats the absence of family as private matter, and it leaves
individuals to bear the consequences.  But an alternative legal regime might
treat the absence of family differently: the law might expand, beyond formal
marriage and parenthood, the categories of privileged caregivers.  Or it
might take into account the absence of family in determining social benefits,
paying—for instance—higher benefits to an individual with a disability who
lives alone (like Elma Wilson).
But, once again, the prospect of insuring the absence of family raises
hard questions.  Should we conceptualize the absence of family as an indi-
vidual choice?  Some people, after all, have personal traits (irritability or
rigidity) or habits that alienate others.  Or should we take into account that
the absence of family can arise in different ways—and often reflects a mix-
ture of luck, personal traits, and the larger social situation?
At first, it may seem uncomfortable to conceive of personal relation-
ships as a matter for state concern.  It may seem obviously unfair for those
who form relationships easily and persist in them to subsidize those who are
hostile, prickly, or just peripatetic in their relationships.  But a moment’s
thought suggests that analogous concerns arise in insuring work disruption.
For instance, some worry that unemployment insurance subsidizes people
who bring unemployment on themselves by choosing the wrong career, the
wrong boss, or a failing company.  Others object that workers in low-risk
76 See Romero, supra note 67, at 3–4.
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jobs must pay for others who choose riskier jobs.  Still others worry that
social insurance for unemployment and disability may lead the opportunistic
to remain unemployed too long.
But these are all considered tractable—if not entirely soluble—
problems in social insurance directed at work disruption, and we can bring
the same theoretical and technical tools to bear in analyzing disruptions in
affective life.  Cultural and moral cross-subsidies are pervasive in the mod-
ern states, and there are normative theories that address when it is—and is
not—permissible to ask one group of people to bear risks undertaken by
others.  Moral hazard permeates every form of insurance, and while severe
moral hazard can preclude insurance altogether, there are a host of tools for
managing it, including copayments, categorical eligibility, delayed benefits,
limited benefits, self-financing, and so on.
While these questions await a more sustained treatment, this Essay has
aimed to plant the first seed: family tragedy is not simply a product of pri-
vate failings, private choices, and private luck.  Instead, family distress re-
flects legal structures that allocate risks and define the obligations of citizens
to one another.  To alter present patterns of privilege and vulnerability, we
must look to reforms in family law, in social insurance, and in other legal
structures.
